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The book behind the word meme

The Selfish Gene and the word that left biology

By Phil Springer, Editor · Published · Updated · Word Stumper

The Selfish Gene and the word that left biology

The Selfish Gene introduced meme in 1976 as a deliberately compact name for something that could be copied through culture. Richard Dawkins shortened mimeme, drawing on a Greek root associated with imitation, because he wanted a single syllable resembling gene. He even specified its sound: it should rhyme with cream. The examples were conspicuously ordinary. Tunes and catchphrases stood alongside fashions, pottery techniques, and ways of building arches. The new word covered things people passed to one another, rather than a particular kind of picture, joke, or electronic message.

The naming occurs in the section headed Memes: The New Replicators. Dawkins asks whether genes are the only entities capable of supporting an evolutionary process. His proposed cultural examples extend that argument beyond DNA. He imagines a scientific idea moving among colleagues and students through speech and publication. He explicitly introduces the gene into his cultural argument as an analogy. What matters to the comparison is the ability to make copies, rather than the particular chemistry that makes genetic replication possible. The Selfish Gene locates its new word within that proposed extension of evolutionary reasoning.

Susan Blackmore subsequently made the broader interpretation explicit. In her 2006 essay Darwin's Meme for Oxford University Press, she argues that copying, variation, and selection apply to songs, ideas, technologies, and works of art. Her proposed perspective treats human beings as products of two replicating systems, cultural as well as genetic. She credits accumulated cultural copying with shaping capacities and interests such as music and art. These are Blackmore's theoretical claims about human development, extending the concept into an explanation of how human minds became effective transmitters of culture.

Blackmore also follows the copying process into its machinery. Printing presses, computers, and the web become further means through which cultural material can circulate. In her formulation, people who copy memes have created new devices that copy them too. The emphasis falls on differential transmission: which things get copied, with what changes, and through which channels. The shift from a tune exchanged between people to a tune carried by technology does not, in that argument, require a wholly new category. It enlarges the means by which the proposed cultural replicators persist and spread.

Measuring such a unit is a separate problem. In a 2011 scientific perspective, Adam McNamara distinguishes a meme represented within the nervous system from one represented externally in the environment. His examples expose the uncertainty in deciding what one unit contains. A word for a chair, recognizing a chair, understanding its use, and being able to pronounce its name involve different processes. Lumping them together makes measurement difficult. McNamara proposes investigating changes in neural connections as people learn and reproduce communicable material, making the definition part of an experimental programme rather than treating the analogy as sufficient evidence.

He describes work in which people learned associations between unfamiliar sounds and unfamiliar gestures by watching and imitating. Requiring a reproducible action mattered to his interpretation: the learned association could then be communicated. Imaging could track changes during learning, although the analysis described functional connections rather than establishing the direction of a causal influence. McNamara's proposal thus introduces a narrower operational setting than a general claim that every idea behaves like a gene. An engineered association gives a study something specific to follow; its relationship to naturally circulating culture still needs an argument.

In 2015, philosophers Andreas De Block and Grant Ramsey identified another difficulty in The Life of Culture. Organisms can usually be counted as separate living things. Cultural units have less obvious boundaries, and their survival and reproduction are harder to define. A song can disappear from use yet remain in a book or film until someone revives it. Remembering a tune and recording a performance also create different possible measures of reproduction. Their proposed response is to connect cultural transmission to organisms and their behavior. A cultural variant would count once for each person possessing it; another person's adoption would constitute transmission. Their botanical comparison distinguishes counting plants with a particular flower color from counting every flower growing on those plants. The choice of what to count changes the proposed measurement.

Dawkins encountered a more public change of meaning in a 2013 WIRED interview. Asked about internet usage, he described it as a subset of the original idea and connected it to the viral comparison he had already used. The accompanying coverage distinguished deliberately altered online creations from random copying errors. His response accepted a family resemblance without making every digital variation a genetic equivalent. A word designed to describe transmission had itself been transmitted, acquiring a narrower everyday application while retaining its older technical history in The Selfish Gene.

The Question

Which book introduced the word 'meme'?

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The Answer

The Selfish Gene. Richard Dawkins introduced the term in 1976 for a unit of cultural transmission, with examples including melodies, catchphrases, and fashion.

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